Preparing for the Astros Rotation

Our upcoming series against Houston could determine whether the Marlins or the Astros will be in the post-season. With the Astros currently scheduling Clemens, Pettitte and Oswalt for the weekend series against the Brewers, it looks like we may face some combination of Astacio, Backe, or Rodriguez in the first two games, and then Clemens and Pettitte on Wednesday and Thursday. However, I would not be surprised to see Garner juggle the rotation, give Oswalt an extra day of rest, and start him against the more potent Marlins lineup on Monday.

Whether we face two or three of the Astro's big three pitchers, any of which would be the staff ace on most other teams, we should have a different one approach to the game when facing Clemens, Pettitte and potentially Oswalt, and another approach when facing Astacio, Backe, and Rodriguez.

The first thing a hitter needs is a plan going to the plate. For the plan to work, the batter needs to know the matchup. This starts by knowing what kind of hitter his is. He needs to know what type of pitch he likes, and where he likes it, and just as importantly, where he doesn't. He needs to know whether he is better against righties or lefties, and whether he is comfortable with the pitcher. Unlike Jack McKeon's assumption, a righty-lefty and lefty-righty matchup is not always effective. Cabrera, Pierre, and Treanor all are putting up better numbers against “same-handers.” Delgado, as expected, puts up better numbers against right handers, but has performed incredibly well against Pettitte (20 for 55 with 5 Hrs). Likewise, Encarnacion, while preferring lefties, has done well against both Clemens (6 for 21) and Oswalt (4 for 12).

In addition to knowing how comfortable he is with the pitcher, the batter needs to know the pitcher's arsenal, and how effective each pitch in that arsenal is that day. He needs to know what the pitcher is likely to throw ahead in the count, behind in the counter, and what, if any, is his strike out pitch. There should be scouts watching the pitchers every move prior to the game, and relay what pitches are working, and note any indications of anything unusual in the delivery. Each inning, this information needs to be updated with the live performance from the prior inning, and the current inning's warm-up. The hitting instructor should be perhaps the most active of all the coaches, and be very communicative during a game, and yet not cross the line into inundation.

Finally, the batter need to know the home plate umpire and how they enforce the strike zone. Some umpires, such as Laz Diaz, will change the strike zone pitch-to-pitch and drive both the pitcher and batter into a frenzy. Also, unfortunately, some umpires are intimidated by or otherwise favor certain pitchers. Just as a pitcher may not have his best stuff one day, the same is true with the umpires. In those cases, the strike zone may have moved a couple inches, usually in the vertical, from the last time the batter saw him. The worst an umpire can be is inconsistent, which makes a batter have to expand the hitting zone regardless of all other circumstances.

When facing Astacio, Backe, and Rodriguez, and indeed most pitchers, unless the pitcher is having an exceptionally good day, the batters should be more patient and shrink the hitting zone, look for his pitch, and drive it. Under the McKeon-Robinson administration, the Marlins chronic lack of patience has turned the mediocre pitchers into Cy Young. The Marlins batters have been consistently flailing away at the pitcher's pitch, not driving the ball, swing at pitches that are in the weakest part of their zone. When the Marlins do get hits, they are far too often settling for weak singles that are not driving in runs. As a result, for almost the entire season, the Marlins have been the worst, or one of the worst three teams in all of MLB, in the ratio of their extra base hits to hits.

Against the top shelf pitchers, such as Clemens, Pettitte and Oswalt, and about 10 or 12 others pitchers in the NL, when they are having even an average day, the batter cannot wait for his pitch because there is very little chance of seeing it. When facing these pitchers, it is usually better to be more aggressive and expand the hitting zone.

The approach to the at bat is fluid, and can change not just pitcher to pitcher, but as quickly as pitch to pitch. This is one of several types of adjustments that the Marlins have failed to make. Even if it is Clemens on the mound, and the batter is ahead in the count, the batter can shrink the hitting zone for a few pitches. About the only thing more maddening than a first pitch ground into double play is when the Marlins do it on a 2-0 or 3-0, 3-1 count with a pitch that is outside the heart of the batter's zone. As alluded to above, if the pitcher is losing command, or showing signs of fatigue, as was the case against Patterson in the 4^th and 5^th innings in our last appearance in RFK, the hitting zone should again be tightened up.

Another adjustment that the Marlins fail to make, and which has cost them dearly, is the failure to adapt to the game situation when the game is close and late. Once again, the Marlins have been one of the worst teams in all of MLB in this situation. If Cabrera, Delgado, and at times, Encarnacion, are the winning or tying run, and nobody is in scoring position, they have gone to the plate without any patience. In those situations, since the can tie or win the game with one swing, they should be shrinking the hitting zone and waiting for their pitch, regardless of the pitcher or the count up until a two strike count.

Another adjustment, one which most batters do make even if doing so unconciously, is when a hitter is “in the zone” and nobody can get him out, regardless of the pitcher, he can shrink the hitting zone and wait on his pitch.

Perhaps the most common adjustment is when the batter is facing a two strike count. Then he needs to guard the plate, and, with certain umpires, a little bit more than the plate. This is usually done best by opening the stance a little bit and moving closer to the plate. This enables a short, quick, controlled swing that protects all the strike zone and is more likely to put the ball in play. Once again, the Marlins are among the worst teams when facing two strike counts.

Unfortunately, the Marlins have failed miserably all season at having any remotely competent approach to the games, and have done even worse at making in-game adjustments. While this may not show up in the team batting average, it does show in runs scored, scoring three or fewer runs in approximately half our games, and most importantly, the won-loss record. This is perhaps the primary reason the Marlins have not been able to get on an extended winning streak all season. Our post-season hopes depend largely upon whether they will start having the proper pre-game approach, and make the proper in-game adjustments, for the next three weeks.